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______________________
OPINION
______________________

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal concerns whether a mortgagor or mortgagee is entitled to hazard
insurance proceeds in excess of a deficiency judgment for damage that occurred to a
property prior to foreclosure. 3039 B Street Associates, Inc. (“3039 B”), a former
mortgagor, appeals from the District Court’s summary judgment order awarding
Investors Trust LLC (“Investors”), the mortgagee, proceeds of an insurance payout for
damage to a warehouse that 3039 B lost in foreclosure proceedings. For the following
reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s order to the extent that it awards Investors
the proceeds of the insurance policy in excess of the deficiency judgment it held against
3039 B, and remand for entry of an order awarding these proceeds to 3039 B.
I.
3039 B previously owned real property consisting of a warehouse in Philadelphia.
Investors was the mortgagee of the property and held a note for $250,000. 3039 B was
required to maintain a hazard insurance policy on the property and it procured a policy



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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from the Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”). The relevant language of the
mortgage states:
. . . In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to
the insurance carrier and Lender. . . .
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing,
insurance proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of
the Property damaged . . . . If the restoration or repair is not
economically feasible or Lender’s security would be lessened,
the insurance proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured
by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with any
excess paid to Borrower. . . .
. . . If . . . the Property is acquired by Lender, Borrower’s
right to any insurance policies and proceeds resulting from
damage to the Property prior to the acquisition shall pass to
Lender to the extent of the sums secured by this Security
Instrument immediately prior to the acquisition.
Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 7, Ex. B. The policy from Lexington included a standard mortgage
clause, which required Lexington to pay the proceeds of the policy to Investors, as
mortgagee, in the event of a loss.
3039 B’s property was damaged by vandals in 2010. Lexington found that the
value of the loss claim was $206,349.72 and initially paid $66,507.74 to Investors, which
Investors applied to 3039 B’s note.
Before Lexington issued the remainder of the insurance proceeds, 3039 B
defaulted on the mortgage and Investors initiated foreclosure proceedings. Investors
purchased the property at the sheriff’s sale and the state court determined, pursuant to
Pennsylvania’s Deficiency Judgment Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8103, that the fair market
value of the property was $250,000. The court determined that Investors’ damages were
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$287,410.571 and entered a deficiency judgment of $37,410.57 against 3039 B.
Lexington agreed that it was obligated to pay $130,041.982 and filed an
interpleader action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 to determine whether
3039 B or Investors was entitled to the insurance proceeds.3 Both 3039 B and Investors
moved for summary judgment. The District Court ruled that 3039 B was not entitled to
the insurance proceeds because the foreclosure on the property terminated its interest in
the property. Thus, the court determined that Investors was entitled to the funds in excess
of the deficiency judgment. This timely appeal followed.
II.4
A.
Our review of a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment is plenary.
Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2009). A “court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
As this case arises through diversity jurisdiction, we must apply Pennsylvania law
and “‘[i]n the absence of any clear precedent of the state’s highest court, we must predict

These damages include the principal owed, interest, late fees, and attorneys’ fees.
Lexington determined that $130,041.98 was due under the policy by subtracting the
already disbursed payments, $66,307.74, and the policy’s deductible, $10,000, from the
calculated damage amount of $206,349.72. The record, however, shows that the sum of
payments already disbursed by Lexington is $66,507.74.
3
This action included several crossclaims between 3039 B, Investors, Lexington, and the
insurance adjuster. As the only issue on appeal concerns 3039 B and Investors, our
discussion is limited to which party is entitled to insurance proceeds from the 2010 loss.
4
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
2
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how that court would resolve the issue.’” Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 22021 (3d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Yurecka v. Zappala, 472 F.3d 59, 62
(3d Cir. 2006)). Intermediate state appellate court decisions are “a datum for ascertaining
state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by
otherwise persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.”
Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Bosch’s Estate, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1976) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
B.
The District Court correctly noted that “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet
to determine the effect of foreclosure on a mortgagee’s right to claim insurance
proceeds,” and therefore, we must predict how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would
rule on this issue. App. at 35. The District Court relied on the Pennsylvania Superior
Court’s opinion in Laurel National Bank v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 444 A.2d 130, 133
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) [hereinafter “Laurel”] for the proposition that 3039 B’s interest in
the insurance proceeds was extinguished by Investors’ foreclosure on the property.
Although we agree that Laurel is useful to predict how the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would rule, we do not agree on the opinion’s application to this case.
In Laurel, the issue was whether the mortgagors, who held a homeowners’
insurance policy, or the mortgagee, were entitled to the proceeds from that policy for a
fire that occurred after the mortgagee foreclosed on and purchased the property at the
sheriff’s sale. 444 A.2d at 131. The Laurel court held that “[t]he mortgagor’s rights to
any insurance proceeds were cut off by foreclosure but the mortgagee’s rights to any
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insurance proceeds increased while remaining insured under the policy by the standard
mortgage clause.” Id. at 133. Importantly, the Laurel court noted
that where the loss precedes the foreclosure, the rule is
different since the mortgagee may satisfy the mortgage
indebtedness by two different means. First he may recover up
to the limits of the policy the full amount of the mortgage
debt under the standard mortgage clause. The second
alternative is to satisfy the mortgage debt through foreclosure
and then recover the balance due, if there is any, under the
insurance policy as owner.
Id. at 133-34 (citing Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co v. Wilborn, 279 So. 2d 460 (Ala.
1973); Cont’l Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Rotholz, 133 So. 587 (Ala. 1931)). Moreover, where the
loss precedes the foreclosure, the sheriff’s sale and the subsequent “‘satisfaction of the
debt takes into account the damaged conditions of the property at the time of the
foreclosure. [T]o allow recovery of insurance proceeds by the mortgagee after full
satisfaction of the debt would amount to [the] mortgagee’s unjust enrichment.’” Id. at
134 (quoting Wilborn, 279 So. 2d at 464) (first alteration in original).
The principal difference between the mortgagee in Laurel and Investors is that the
mortgagee in Laurel assumed ownership of the property before the loss, and therefore its
“insurable interest was that of owner and not that of mortgagee.” 5 Id at 134 n.1.
Accordingly, Laurel supports our prediction that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
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Other jurisdictions have also concluded that a mortgagee may not recover more than the
amount of indebtedness for losses sustained prior to foreclosure. See, e.g., Lenart v.
Ocwen Fin. Corp., 869 So. 2d 588, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Wilborn and
holding that in a pre-foreclosure loss “[i]f the mortgagee elects to foreclose on the
property and the foreclosure sale does not bring the full amount of the mortgage debt,
then the mortgagee may recover the deficiency under the insurance policy as owner.”); W.
Employers Ins. v. Bank of Ravenswood, 512 N.E. 2d 9, 10-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (same).
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would rule that where a loss precedes foreclosure, a mortgagee is entitled to insurance
proceeds to satisfy any deficiency still existing after foreclosure. However, we predict
that the Supreme Court would rule that a mortgagor is entitled to the proceeds in excess
of a deficiency judgment because the foreclosure sale of the property took into account
the condition of the property after the loss.
C.
Investors argues that the express language of the mortgage contract provides that
in the event of a foreclosure, 3039 B’s interest in any insurance proceeds resulting from
damage to the property prior to foreclosure shall be acquired by Investors after
foreclosure. Pennsylvania contract law principles require that we interpret a contract by
its express language when it is clear and unequivocal, and in a way that “give[s] effect to
all of the provisions therein.” Capek v. Devito, 767 A.2d 1047, 1050 (Pa. 2001) (internal
citation omitted). The parties have not cited, and we have not found, a Pennsylvania case
concerning the interpretation of this standard clause’s assignment of insurance rights after
foreclosure. However, other courts have considered this clause and determined that it is
“collateral security for the mortgage debt” and “[a]n assignment made as collateral
security for a debt gives the assignee only a qualified interest” up to the amount of
indebtedness, “even though the assignment is absolute on its face.” Emmons v. Lake
States Ins. Co., 484 N.W. 2d 712, 714 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); see also Fire Ins. Exch. v.
Bowers, 994 S.W. 2d 110, 112-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (same and commenting that
“[h]ad the property brought less [than the amount of indebtedness upon foreclosure], the
claim of the bank would remain, but not exceeding the balance then owed.”).
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We predict that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would interpret the language
of this clause to secure 3039 B’s debt owed with the insurance policy as collateral.
Accordingly, Investors could recover to the extent of the indebtedness from the insurance
policy, but not the insurance proceeds in excess of the deficiency judgment.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is reversed and
remanded with instructions to enter a judgment in the amount of $92,631.41 in favor of
3039 B.6

Investors also urges that Horbal v. Moxham Nat’l Bank, 697 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997), and
Option One Mortgage Corp v. Fitzgerald, 687 F. Supp. 2d 520 (M.D. Pa. 2009), control
this case and provide a theory whereby it should be entitled to the rest of the insurance
proceeds. We disagree. Horbal and Option One address the situation in which a
mortgagee forecloses on the subject property and does not bring a deficiency judgment
action. Those cases held that while the penalty for not doing so is the inability to proceed
against the personal assets of the debtor for the satisfaction of the debt, a CD and
insurance proceeds, respectively, were not vested in the debtor at the time of foreclosure
and therefore were not personal assets of the debtor. Thus, the mortgagee was entitled to
apply them to reduce the debt. Notably, the debt was the full amount owed at the time of
foreclosure, not reduced by a deficiency judgment. Here, the mortgagee, having
proceeded under the Deficiency Judgment Act, has had its debt reduced by the value of
the property and has no claim to any property once the $37,410.57 in remaining debt was
satisfied. Thus, Horbal and Option One address a totally different fact pattern and are
not relevant let alone controlling here.
6
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